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Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comment on the ICTR’s
Judgment in The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, et al.
by Dia ne F. Orentlicher
require States Parties to proscribe not only speech that incites its listeners to racial violence, but also “hate speech” — a term I will use in
this article to connote speech that incites its audience to racial discrimination7 or hatred, even when it does not entail incitement to violence.
The third treaty, the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,8 has been authoritatively
interpreted to allow (but not require) States Parties to proscribe hate
speech under certain conditions.
Although its analysis is somewhat ambiguous, Trial Chamber
I apparently treated the hate-speech law associated with these
treaties as the most pertinent guide to its interpretation of the
Genocide Convention’s provision on incitement to commit genocide. The chamber signaled as much when it began its discussion

O

N DECEMBER 3, 2003, a trial chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered the most important judgment relating to the law of
incitement in the context of international criminal law
since Nuremberg. In its long awaited judgment in The Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, et al.1 (Nahimana), the ICTR’s Trial Chamber I convicted
three defendants of, among other charges, (1) genocide, (2) direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, and (3) persecution as a crime
against humanity based upon the defendants’ responsibility for incendiary radio broadcasts and newspaper articles. Two defendants,
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Baraygwiza, were convicted
because of their roles in Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM), which is deservedly infamous for its central role in inciting
and directing the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. One writer succinctly
summarized RTLM’s role in the 1994 genocide this way: “RTLM
exhorted Hutus to exterminate Tutsis and moderate Hutus, identified
specific targets, and helped coordinate attacks.”2 The third defendant,
Hassan Ngeze, was convicted for his role as editor-in-chief of the
newspaper Kangura. An appeal of this decision is now pending before
the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber.
There can be little doubt that the defendants in this case
deserved to be convicted for their proven roles in the 1994
Rwandan genocide. Even so, the Appeals Chamber should adopt a
different approach to the speech-related charges than that taken by
the trial chamber. The principal reasons can be briefly stated: several aspects of the trial chamber’s judgment represent an expansive
interpretation of relevant international crimes, while other aspects
of the court’s reasoning would benefit from clarification. To the
extent that the defendants’ convictions were based upon novel
interpretations of relevant crimes, the judgment imperils a fundamental principle of international human rights law — the prohibition of retroactive punishment. Although space does not permit
a thorough consideration of the trial chamber’s judgment, two
examples illustrate these concerns.
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INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE
AT TIMES THE JUDGMENT APPEARS TO ENDORSE an expansive
interpretation of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide. The provision of the ICTR’s statute that vests the tribunal
with jurisdiction over this crime3 is taken directly from the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention).4 Accordingly, the law of this treaty
provides the most pertinent guide for interpreting the relevant provision of the ICTR statute. Yet the portion of the Nahimina judgment
that addressed the charge of genocide incitement focused overwhelmingly on the law of three other human rights treaties. Two of these
human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)5 and the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention),6 explicitly
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highlighted by the Prosecution constitute direct incitement. A
Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly, for example, is an article brimming with ethnic hatred but did not call on readers to take
action against the Tutsi population.”11 While the former implication would thwart the intent of the drafters of the Genocide
Convention, the latter observation seems broadly consistent with
their determination to exclude hate speech from the writ of the
incitement provision.
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of the genocide-incitement charges with the assertion that, in its
view, “a review of international law and jurisprudence on incitement to discrimination and violence is helpful as a guide to the
assessment of criminal accountability for direct and public incitement to genocide, in light of the fundamental right of freedom of
expression.”9 The chamber then proceeded to discuss several
sources of law, focusing overwhelmingly on the hate-speech law
associated with the three aforementioned human rights treaties.
As a general rule, it is perfectly appropriate and even desirable to interpret one human rights treaty in light of others. This
approach promotes coherence in human rights treaty law and
helps ensure that states are not subject to conflicting obligations
under different human rights treaties. Even so, it would be inappropriate to use the hate-speech provisions and jurisprudence of
other human rights treaties as a touchstone for interpreting the
Genocide Convention — that is, to assume that the Genocide
Convention’s provision on incitement strikes the same balance
between protected and unprotected speech as the balance embodied in human rights treaties that require or permit States Parties to
proscribe hate speech.
The most important reason is that this approach would fly in
the face of the drafting history of the Genocide Convention. The
travaux préparatoires disclose an unambiguous determination by the
treaty’s drafters to exclude hate speech from the ambit of the clause

“To the extent that the
defendants’ convictions were
based upon novel
interpretations of relevant
crimes, the judgment imperils a
fundamental principle of
international human rights law
— the prohibition of retroactive
punishment."

These and other ambiguities cry out for clarification by the
Appeals Chamber. In particular, the Appeals Chamber should
make clear that “incitement to commit genocide” does not encompass words that, however deeply they affront human decency, do
not advocate the commission of genocide.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY/PERSECUTION
IF TRIAL CHAMBER I STOPPED just short of criminalizing hate
speech under the rubric of incitement to commit genocide, it achieved
much the same result — that is, convicting defendants of an international crime by virtue of hate speech — through an expansive interpretation of the crime against humanity of persecution. In a departure
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that makes “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” a
punishable offense. At several points during the treaty negotiations,
the Soviet delegation proposed text that would have criminalized
not only direct and public incitement to commit genocide, but also
hate speech. Each time, its proposal was rejected.
But while portions of Nahimana moved dangerously close to
endorsing an interpretation at odds with the travaux préparatoires
of the Genocide Convention, other portions of the judgment
hewed more closely to the path charted by the genocide treaty’s
drafters. For example, after implying that speech promoting ethnic
hatred falls beyond the bounds of “protected speech,”10 the trial
chamber noted, “not all of the writings published in Kangura and

Jean-Bosco Baraygwiza, founding member of RTLM.

Ferdinand Nahimana, former director of RTLM.
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from established jurisprudence, the chamber convicted all three defendants of this charge based upon speech that constitutes incitement to
racial hatred, but not incitement to violence.
To understand why this holding represents an innovation, it
is necessary to consider how international tribunals had previously
approached the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity
with respect to speech-related conduct. The leading precedent is
the judgment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT)12 convened at Nuremberg following World War II. Two defendants
before the IMT, Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche, were charged
with crimes against humanity by virtue of anti-Semitic advocacy.13
Streicher was convicted of this charge and sentenced to hang, while
Fritzsche was acquitted.
Trial Chamber I apparently relied upon the Streicher case to
establish that hate speech can form the basis of a conviction for
persecution as a crime against humanity even without a call to
violent action:

Hassan Ngeze, former editor and owner of the Hutu newspaper Kangura.

Unlike the crime of incitement, which is defined in terms
of intent, the crime of persecution is defined also in terms
of impact. It is not a provocation to cause harm. It is itself
the harm. Accordingly, there need not be a call to action
in communications that constitute persecution. For the
same reason, there need be no link between persecution
and acts of violence. The Chamber notes that Julius
Streicher was convicted by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg of persecution as a crime against
humanity for anti-semitic writings that significantly predated the extermination of Jews in the 1940s. Yet they
were understood to be like a poison that infected the
minds of the German people and conditioned them to
follow the lead of the National Socialists in persecuting
the Jewish people. In Rwanda, the virulent writings of
Kangura and the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM functioned in the same way, conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate of harm, as evidenced in part
by the extermination and genocide that followed.14

Moreover, while Fritzsche “sometimes made strong statements of a
propagandistic nature in his broadcasts,” the IMT was “not prepared to hold that they were intended to incite German people to
commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to
have been a participant in the crimes charged.”18 Accordingly,
Fritzsche was acquitted.
Nahimana further misread Nuremberg in claiming that Julius
Streicher was convicted “for anti-semitic writings that significantly predated the extermination of Jews in the 1940s [yet] were
understood to be like a poison that infected the minds of the
German people and conditioned them to follow the lead of the
National Socialists in persecuting the Jewish people.”19 To begin,
Streicher was convicted only with respect to speech-related activities that occurred during World War II. Although the IMT
described Streicher’s “25 years of speaking, writing, and preaching
hatred of the Jews,”20 apparently to establish his unambiguous
intent to incite Germans to exterminate Jews, the Tribunal was at
pains to emphasize that Streicher “continued to write and publish
his propaganda of death” at a time when he knew “of the extermination of the Jews in the occupied territory.”21 Concluding the
portion of its judgment relating to Streicher, the IMT held that
his “incitement to murder and extermination at the time when
Jews in the east were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial
grounds in connection with war crimes, as defined by the
[Nuremberg] Charter,” — that is, during World War II — “and
constitutes a crime against humanity.”22
If Streicher had been convicted of pre-war conduct,
Nuremberg could be more readily interpreted as precedent for convicting a defendant of persecution as a crime against humanity by
virtue of speech that does not qualify as incitement to racist violence but nonetheless helps condition a society to regard members
of a particular group with racial animus. But such an interpretation
would misread Nuremberg. Streicher’s conviction rested squarely
upon his calls for the extermination of Jews at a time when they
were being slaughtered “under the most horrible conditions,” and
when Streicher knew as much.
This interpretation is reinforced by other passages in the
Nuremberg judgment. Immediately after citing a 1940 publication
in Der Stürmer calling for the complete extermination of Jews, the
IMT observed, in a passage paraphrased by Trial Chamber I, “Such

It is difficult to see how the Streicher verdict could support a
conclusion to the effect that “communications that constitute persecution” need not include a call to action, let alone a call to violence. Although the IMT did not clearly enunciate the elements of
persecution as a crime against humanity, its conviction of Streicher
and acquittal of Fritzsche strongly suggest that the Tribunal was
prepared to judge a defendant guilty of persecution as a crime
against humanity based upon his expressive activity only when he
intentionally urged listeners to commit atrocities.
The charges against Streicher were based on his role as publisher of the virulently anti-Semitic weekly newspaper Der
Stürmer, in whose pages Streicher advocated the extermination of
Jews in terms that would readily qualify as direct and public
incitement to commit genocide as that term is used in the
Genocide Convention.15 Streicher was convicted of “persecution
on political and racial grounds” constituting a crime against
humanity based upon his “incitement to murder and extermination” of Jews in Nazi-occupied territory16 — not, as Nahimana
implies, for conduct constituting hate speech that is not linked to
a call to violent action.
In contrast to Streicher’s unambiguous calls for extermination
of Jews, Fritzsche’s speeches, while “show[ing] definite antiSemitism … did not urge persecution or extermination of Jews.”17
3

was the poison Streicher injected into the minds of thousands of
Germans which caused them to follow the National Socialist policy of Jewish persecution and extermination.”23 These last two
words, which were omitted in the above-quoted passage from
Nahimana,24 imply that Streicher’s expressive activity amounted to
a crime against humanity only when linked to extermination.
Fast-forwarding to contemporary case law, the ICTR and its
sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have repeatedly held that the crime
against humanity of persecution requires “a gross or blatant
denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid
down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same
level of gravity”25 as other acts that may constitute a crime against
humanity. Those acts include such conduct as murder, extermination, and torture. Applying a variation of this test in Prosecutor
v. Kordi , et al.,26 an ICTY trial chamber rejected the prosecutor’s
attempt to convict Dario Kordi on the charge of persecution as
a crime against humanity based upon the act of “encouraging and
promoting hatred on political etc. grounds.”27 Noting that the
indictment against Kordi was “the first indictment in the history of the [ICTY] to allege this act as a crime against humanity,”28
the chamber concluded that this conduct “does not by itself constitute persecution as a crime against humanity.”29 The court’s
reasoning is instructive:

But the trial chamber’s judgment in Ruggiu did not go as far
as Nahimana implied.34 Immediately after the passage quoted in
Nahimana, the Ruggiu judgment continued, “The deprivation of
these rights can be said to have as its aim the death and removal of
those persons from the society in which they live alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.”35 Thus the
Ruggiu judgment did not explicitly hold that advocacy of racial
hatred, as distinguished from speech advocating racial violence,
could form the basis of a persecution conviction. Instead it found
that RTLM broadcasts aimed at “the death and removal” of the
Tutsi minority “from the society in which they live . . . or eventually even from humanity itself ” qualified as the crime against
humanity of persecution.
Trial Chamber I sought to justify its conclusion that hate
speech constitutes the crime against humanity of persecution by
characterizing such speech as “a discriminatory form of aggression
that destroys the dignity of those in the group under attack.”36 The
judgment continued:
[Hate speech] creates a lesser status not only in the eyes
of the group members themselves but also in the eyes
of others who perceive and treat them as less than
human. The denigration of persons on the basis of
their ethnic identity or other group membership in
and of itself, as well as in its other consequences, can
be an irreversible harm.37

It is not enumerated as a crime elsewhere in the [ICTY]
Statute, but most importantly, it does not rise to the
same level of gravity as the other acts enumerated in
Article 5 [of the statute]. Furthermore, the criminal
prohibition of this act has not attained the status of customary international law. Thus to convict the accused
for such an act as is alleged as persecution would violate
the principle of legality.30

From this observation it was a short step toward the conclusion that it is not necessary to establish that the speech in question
constitutes incitement to commit another crime. Rather, the
chamber found, the effect of hate speech “is itself the harm” that
amounts to persecution.38
This approach makes powerful and compelling claims. But
they are properly addressed in fora other than an international
criminal tribunal whose statute does not provide a clearly established basis for jurisdiction over hate speech. As ICTY judgments
have noted, the principle of legality requires that “acts in respect
of which [a defendant is] indicted under the heading of persecution must be found to constitute crimes under international law
at the time of their commission.”39 Accordingly, “there must be
clearly defined limits on the expansion of the types of acts which
qualify as persecution.”40

Although this judgment was rendered more than two and
one-half years before Trial Chamber I rendered its verdict in
Nahimana, the ICTR chamber made no mention of Kordiç and
reached the opposite conclusion. Citing just one precedent, an
ICTR judgment that had been based upon a guilty plea, Trial
Chamber I wrote that it “consider[ed] it evident that hate speech
targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or other discriminatory grounds, reaches [the same] level of gravity [as the other
crimes against humanity enumerated in its Statute] and constitutes
persecution under Article 3(h) of its Statute.”31 The chamber
asserted that the ICTR had “so held” in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu,32
“finding that the radio broadcasts of RTLM, in singling out and
attacking the Tutsi ethnic minority, constituted a deprivation of
the ‘fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed
by members of the wider society.’”33

CONCLUSION
If some aspects of Nahimana are worrying, the judgment as
a whole provides an invaluable account of the media’s key role in
the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This, in itself, is an historic measHRB
ure of justice.
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